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Social Security Benefits to Widows: The
Ongoing Favoritism of Single-Earner




President Clinton said it best in his 1999 State of the Union
Address when he said, "[w]e should reduce poverty among elderly
women, who are nearly twice as likely to be poor as our other sen-
iors."' Based on recent reports, the Social Security fund is pro-
jected to be insolvent by 2029.2 As a result of this prognosis, a
wealth of proposals have been championed to address the insol-
vency problem. Caught in the middle of all these proposed Social
Security reforms is a population of widows currently receiving So-
cial Security benefits.3 For many of these women, their surviving
spouse benefits provided by Social Security are not sufficient to
prevent them from falling into poverty.4 Even more troubling,
most within this population of widows have worked at some point
in their lives and contributed to the Social Security Fund.5 Yet,
when the time comes for them to collect from the Social Security
* J.D. expected 2000, University of Minnesota; B.S. 1992, George Mason
University. The Author wishes to thank all who have assisted on this Article. The
author is especially grateful to Professor Karen C. Burke for her guidance.
1. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
35 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 78, 79 (Jan. 19, 1999) [hereinafter State of the Un-
ion].
2. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose Pension Is It Anyway? Protecting
Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1658
(1998) [hereinafter Forman, Protecting].
3. See Laura E. Stiglin, A Classic Case of Overreaction: Women and Social
Security, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Jan./Feb. 1981, at 29, 30 (discussing supplemen-
tary benefits available to widows of retired workers under the 1939 Social Security
Amendment).
4. See NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON
SOCIAL SECURITY, WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 12 (1998) [hereinafter
WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY] (noting that the poverty rate for elderly wid-
owed women is 18% compared to a rate of only 4.6% for elderly married couples in
1997).
5 See id. at 11.
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Fund, they are finding that their work efforts do not provide for
any additional benefits.6 This result is due primarily to the anti-
quated benefit rules currently in place in the Social Security
Regulations. 7
Despite the increasing number of dual-earner families, the
current Social Security distribution regulations do not reflect this
change; rather they still favor single-earner families.8 As a result,
dual-earner married couples face the "marriage tax penalty"9 while
they are working, and receive lower Social Security benefits than
single-earner families when they retire.10 While this disparity in
distribution of benefits is inequitable, the impact on the surviving
spouse receiving Social Security benefits after the death of a
spouse is even more significant. During the period when both
spouses are alive, the likelihood of the couple falling into poverty is
low. 1 However, the risk of one spouse falling into poverty in-
creases significantly when the other spouse dies. 12 This increase is
6. See Stiglin, supra note 3, at 32 (commenting that working women often "do
not get their 'money's worth' from Social Security" because even though these
women have paid into Social Security from their wages "they often get no or only
slightly higher benefits as workers than.., as spouses"); see also Jonathan Barry
Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement Program: Partial
Integration and a Credit for Dual-Earner Couples, 45 TAX LAW. 915, 946 (1992)
[hereinafter Forman, Fairness]. Under the dual-entitlement rule, discussed infra
notes 58-59 and accompanying text, often the benefits to the secondary earner are
based on the primary earner's earnings. See id.
7. See RICHARD V. BURKHAUSER & TIMOTHY M. SMEEDING, SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM: A BUDGET NEUTRAL APPROACH TO REDUCING OLDER WOMEN'S DIS-
PROPORTIONATE RISK OF POVERTY 15 (Maxwell Sch. of Citizenship & Pub. Aff. Cen-
ter for Pol'y Res. Policy Brief No. 2, 1994) (noting that the current Social Security
benefit pay-out rules are "obsolete ... [and] no longer reflect the changed working
patterns of men and women within marriage"); see also Karen C. Burke & Grayson
M. P. McCouch, Women, Fairness, and Social Security, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1219
(1997) (arguing that "the system of spousal benefits 'undermines the incentive of
the potential second-earner spouse to enter the work force' and reinforces the bias
in favor of the 'traditional' family with a 'working husband' and a 'stay-at-home'
wife").
8. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 10.
9. In situations where both spouses earn equivalent amounts, their combined
tax is greater than if they had filed as single individuals. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE:
MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX at xiii (1997). On the other hand, single-
earner families (or cases where one spouse's earnings is greatly larger than the
other spouse's earnings) do not face such a situation. See id.
10. See Alicia H. Munnell & Laura E. Stiglin, Women and a Two-Tier Social
Security System, in A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL SECURITY: THE CHANGING ROLES OF
WOMEN AND MEN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 104 (Richard V. Burkhauser & Karen C.
Holden eds., 1980).
11. See WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 4, at 12 (citing the pov-
erty rate for elderly married couples as 4.6% in 1997).
12. See id. The poverty rate for widowed women and men increases to 18%
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due primarily to the decrease in benefits provided to surviving
spouses.13
Furthermore, this phenomenon has a disparate impact on
elderly women, 14 since women live longer. 15 For example, in
March 1997 nearly five million surviving spouses received Social
Security benefits.16 Of these five million, nearly all individuals re-
ceiving spousal or survivor benefits were women. 17 Additionally,
on average, women remain widows for seventeen years.18 Social
Security is, and will most likely continue to be, a significant source
of income for these retired women. 19 Without Social Security, it is
estimated that 60.6% of widows would live in poverty.2 0 Current
estimates indicate that 20.2% of widows over the age of sixty-five
live in poverty.21 At the same time widows are facing these hard-
and 11.4% respectively, from 4.6% when both spouses are alive. See id.
13. See EKATERINA SHIRLEY & PETER SPIEGLER, THE BENEFITS OF SOCIAL
SECURITY PRIVATIZATION FOR WOMEN 2, 5 (The Cato Project On Soc. Security Pri-
vatization No. 12, 1998); see also Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, Women's Retire-
ment Security, 4 ELDER L.J. 493, 495 (1996) (stating that 80% of the elderly wid-
ows who are living below the poverty standard were not poor when their spouses
were alive). Additional factors contributing to the financial difficulties faced by
widows are a decline in pension income and other assets. See WOMEN AND
RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 4, at 14. At the death of the spouse, assets
available to the widow may be reduced because they are bequeathed to other fam-
ily members or were used to cover medical expenses for the deceased. See id.
14. See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that Social Security
"treatment of dual-earner couples is generally perceived as a women's issue").
15. See WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that at
65, a woman can expect to live to 85 while a man only to 81). This gap in life ex-
pectancy between men and women is expected to continue in the future. See id.
16. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Reforming Social Security to Encourage the
Elderly to Work, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 289, 291 (1998) [hereinafter Forman, Re-
forming].
17. See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 13, at 4 (citing that women compose
99% of individuals receiving Social Security benefits under the spousal and sur-
vival benefits). One study reported that women are nearly three times as likely as
older men to be widowed (49% to 14%). See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note
7, at 2.
18. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 10.
19. See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 13, at 5 (stating that "[n]on-married
women over 65 rely on Social Security for 72 percent of their retirement income,
on average .... Forty percent of non-married women over 65 rely on Social Secu-
rity for 90 percent or more of their retirement income"); see also WOMEN AND
RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that without Social Security,
nearly 52.2 % of women would be living in poverty).
20. See WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 4, at 7. Additionally,
nearly 25% of unmarried women rely on Social Security as their sole source of in-
come. See id.
21. See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 13, at 2. Other sources estimate the
poverty rate for elderly widows at 18%. See WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY,
supra note 4, at 7. It is estimated that widows comprise 64% of the elderly women
currently in poverty. See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 13, at 4. Although
women represent approximately 60% of individuals over 65, women also represent
1999]
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ships, future retired people will be coming from dual-earner fami-
lies.2 2 Therefore, the disparity of benefits received by widows from
single-earner families and dual-earner families only further exac-
erbates these problems.
This Article examines the current disparity in Social Security
benefits paid to widows based on Social Security's treatment of
dual-earner and single-earner families. Part II provides an over-
view of the Social Security system, including a description of the
funding and benefit distribution system currently in place.23 Part
III describes some of the problems facing Social Security. 24 Part
IV examines the major proposals presently under consideration
and the impact of each proposal on benefits to widows and the dis-
parity in place. 25 Finally, Part V of this Article describes the
author's proposed reform regarding benefits for widows. 26
II. Social Security Overview
Social Security was enacted in 1935 when the country was
trying to come out of the Great Depression. 27 The purpose of the
Social Security Act was to provide benefits to individuals during
their retirement.2 8 This type of social insurance was considered
especially important in a time when workers faced uncertainty as
to their current and future prospects. 29
nearly 75% of the elderly poor. See Moseley-Braun, supra note 13, at 494. In addi-
tion, statistics show that an elderly woman is "twice as likely as a man to live be-
low the poverty line." Id.
22. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 12.
23. See infra notes 27-62 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 96-167 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
27. See John C. Goodman & Dorman E. Cordell, The Nightmare in Our Future:
Elderly Entitlements, NAT'L CENTER FOR POLY ANALYSIS Report No. 212 (January
1998) <http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s212.html>. Although the Social Security Act
was passed with other welfare legislation, Social Security was not intended to be a
welfare program. See Social Security Administration, Social Security History Page
(visited Nov. 13, 1998) <http://www.ssa.gov/history/history6.html> [hereinafter
Social Security History Page]. Rather, through its contribution requirement, So-
cial Security was promoted as a way for workers to contribute to their own future
retirement benefit. See id.; see also Burke & McCouch, supra note 7, at 1213
(stating that "[t]he formal linkage between wages, contributions, and benefits dis-
tinguishes Social Security from pure social welfare programs and reinforces the
widely-held perception of Social Security benefits as an 'earned right"').
28. See Social Security History Page, supra note 27 (explaining that the Social
Security Act was viewed as a means "to address the long-range problem of eco-
nomic security for the aged").
29. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL
SECURITY 4 (1995) (quoting President Roosevelt at the August 14, 1935 signing of
the Social Security Act as stating "we have tried to frame a law which will give
[Vol. 17:537
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The current Social Security system is composed of three pro-
grams: (i) Old age and survivors insurance (OASI); (ii) Disability
insurance; and (iii) Hospital insurance (better known as Medi-
care).30 This Article focuses primarily on OASI, the program that
provides income to retirees. Presently, under OASI, individuals
are eligible for Social Security benefits at age sixty-five. 31 Indi-
viduals may elect to retire at sixty-two 32 but will receive a lower
level of Social Security benefits. 33 The amount of an individual's
Social Security benefits is based on the individual's earning record
over his or her employment history. 34
A. Funding Social Security
Funding for the Social Security program is done through a
payroll tax, better known as FICA (Federal Insurance Contribu-
some measure of protection to the average citizen and to his family against the
loss of a job and against poverty-ridden old age").
30. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 915.
31. See id. at 922 (noting that the standard retirement age is 65 under Social
Security); see also Goodman & Cordell, supra note 27. The standard retirement
age is projected to increase to 67 in the year 2000. See id.
32. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 921 (noting that Social Security
benefits are available to individuals over the age of 62 "if they have worked in cov-
ered employment for at least ten years"). As a result of expansions and favorable
economic conditions in private pensions, workers are retiring earlier. See
BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 3.
33. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 923.
34. See id. at 921. This amount is also referred to as the individual's Average
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). See id. at 921-22. The AIME measures the
taxpayer's "career-average monthly earnings" while the individual is employed in
covered employment. See id. at 922. Only covered earnings up to the Social Secu-
rity earnings cap are considered for determining the individual's Social Security
benefits. See id. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the earnings cap.
To compute the AIME, an individual's earnings covered by Social Security are
identified and adjusted for inflation. See Forman, Reforming, supra note 16, at
290. Earnings are adjusted for inflation so that wages earned by the individual in
the earlier part of his or her career are comparable with wages earned in the latter
part of his or her career. See id. The highest indexed earnings for a maximum 35
years for the individual are accumulated and divided by the number of years of
wages used for accumulation. See id. This amount is divided by 12 months and
represents the individual's AIME in current dollars. See id.
The computation of AIME is important because it is connected to the monthly
Social Security benefits payable to an individual at the normal retirement age.
See id. The monthly Social Security benefit is commonly referred to as the Pri-
mary Insurance Amount (PIA). See id. Since this amount is based on benefits
payable at the normal retirement age of 65, if an individual retires at an earlier
age, that individual will receive a lower PIA. See id. at 291. For example, workers
who retire at 62 receive only 90% of the PIA at retirement. See id.
1999]
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tions Act).35 Currently, almost ninety-two percent of Americans
contribute to Social Security through the FICA payroll tax.36 In
addition to the employees' contributions, employers must match
the amount their employees contribute to the Social Security
Fund.37  Only wages from covered employment 3  or self-
employment are subject to the FICA payroll tax.39 Income from
capital investments, commonly referred to as passive income, in-
cluding rental income, interest and dividends are not subject to the
FICA payroll tax.40 For 1999, the FICA tax imposed on covered
wages is 7.65%, of which 5.35% is allocated for OASI. 41 The in-
come on which the tax is imposed is capped. 42 For 1998 and 1999,
the income caps are $68,400 and $72,600, respectively.43 The in-
come cap is adjusted annually for inflation.44
Under the current system, it is possible for two families with
equal total earnings to contribute different amounts to the Social
35. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 917.
36. See Forman, Reforming, supra note 16, at 290 (noting that "ninety-six per-
cent of the workforce are in covered employment").
37. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 918. The employees' contribution
along with the employers' matching share is remitted to the Unites States Treas-
ury. See id. Employers are also required to file quarterly tax returns reporting
Social Security tax amounts remitted during the quarter and for the year. See id.
38. Under current law, covered employment is defined as:
any service, of whatever nature, performed... (A) by an employee for the
person employing him, irrespective of the citizenship or residence of ei-
ther, (i) within the United States.... or (B) outside the United States by a
citizen or resident of the United States as an employee (i) of an American
employer .... or (ii) of a foreign affiliate . . . of an American employer
during any period for which there is in effect an agreement.... or (C) if it
is service, regardless of where or by whom performed, which is designated
as employment or recognized as equivalent to employment under an
agreement entered into under section [433 of this title].
42 U.S.C. § 410(a) (1998). Services performed by a student or a minor while em-
ployed by a parent are not considered covered employment. See id.
39. See id. at 918. Beginning in 1984, voluntary contributions to qualified pri-
vate retirement plans as well as amounts deferred to "nonqualified deferred com-
pensation plans" are considered to fall under covered earnings also and are there-
fore subject to the FICA payroll tax. See id. at 919.
40. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 919; see also Goodman & Cordell,
supra note 27, at 8 (discussing proposal to include capital investment income in
the tax base for Social Security purposes).
41. See J. ROBERT TREANOR, ET AL., 1999 GUIDE TO SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE 6 (1998). Additional payroll taxes for disability and Medicare are also
paid by employees and matched by employers. See id. (noting that a .85% and
1.45% payroll tax is imposed on wages for the Disability Fund and Medicare, re-
spectively). As this Article only relates to OASI benefits, discussions regarding the
Medicare/Medicaid portion of the overall Social Security tax will not be discussed.
42. See Forman, Reforming, supra note 16, at 290.
43. See TREANOR, ET. AL, supra note 41, at 7.
44. See Forman, Reforming, supra note 16, at 290.
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SOCIAL SECURITY FOR WIDOWS
Security Fund.45 For example, dual-earner families may contrib-
ute more to the Social Security system than single-earner fami-
lies 46 as demonstrated in Table 1:
Table 1. Comparison of Social Security Contributions of a






OASI TAXES (Employee's share and Employers' share combined)
Husband $7,318 $5,350
Wife 0 5,350
Total Combined $7.18 $10.700
For 1998, the OASI tax of 5.35% is imposed on a maximum of
$68,400 of earned wages. Thus, of Mr. Jones' $100,000 earnings,
only $68,400 was subjected to the OASI tax. Based on this, Mr.
Jones' contribution is calculated by multiplying $68,400 by 5.35%
which results in a total contribution of $3,659. The employers'
mandatory match is reflected in the total contribution for each re-
spective person in the table above.
This disparity is attributed mainly to the earnings cap. 4 7 Of
the Jones' total earnings, only $68,400 is taxed according to Social
Security Regulations. 48 Because both Mr. and Mrs. Smith's wages
are below the earnings cap, their entire salary is taxed individu-
ally. Therefore, although both couples have total wages of
45. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 933.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Forman, Reforming, supra note 16, at 290. Per Social Security Regula-
tions, each individual's earnings is taxed subject to the earnings cap. See id.
Therefore, since Mr. Jones is the sole wage earner in this scenario, the Social Se-
curity cap applies to his earnings.
1999]
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$100,000, the Smiths contribute more to the Social Security Fund
because their entire wages are taxed, as opposed to the Joneses
whose contribution is based on $68,400 of their wages. Despite
this difference in contribution levels, the Joneses, as the discussion
following will demonstrate, will receive higher Social Security
benefits than the Smiths when the time comes for them to retire. 49
B. Distribution of Social Security Benefits
The Social Security system is viewed as a dual-purpose sys-
tem. Benefits to the retired employee are calculated based on the
individual's covered wages before retirement.5 0 Additionally, a
minimum standard of benefits is provided to ensure the retired in-
dividual does not fall into poverty through the Federal Supplemen-
tal Security Income program. 51 In addition to benefits for the tax-
payer, in 1939 Social Security benefits were extended to the spouse
and dependents of the retired taxpayer 52 on the basis of social ade-
quacy. 53 These auxiliary benefits are based on a percentage of the
retired employee's Social Security benefit.54 In the late 1930s, the
norm was for only one spouse, usually the man, to work.55 Bene-
49. See infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
50. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 921-24; supra note 34 (discussing
the calculation of retirement benefits).
51. An underlying objective of Social Security is to provide adequate benefits to
keep retired individuals out of poverty. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note
7, at 3. Under the Federal Supplemental Security Income program, enacted in
1974, a minimum income floor is provided for individuals over the age of 65. See
id. This income level is periodically adjusted for cost of living increases. See id.
52. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 10. In 1956, the Social Se-
curity Act was further amended to include disabled workers as well. See Goodman
& Cordell, supra note 27.
53. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 7, at 1214.
54. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 924-25. The following represents
the current level of benefits each class of dependent/spouse is entitled to, using the
taxpayer's benefits as the base:
CLASS OF DEPENDENT/SPOUSE % OF BENEFIT
Married spouses at age 65 50.0
Mothers, fathers, children 50.0
Widows, widowers at age 65 100.0
Dependent parent at age 62 82.5
Surviving mothers, fathers, children 75.0
See id. at 925 (citing STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102ND CONG.,
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1991 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MA-
TERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 14
(Comm. Print 1991)).
55. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 10. At the time the
amendment to Social Security was enacted, it reflected the societal presumption
544 [Vol. 17:537
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fits for a worker's spouse and dependent were deemed necessary
due to the low level of Social Security benefits paid out in the early
days of Social Security and the presumption of dependency of
women on their husbands. 56 Moreover, spousal benefits were an-
ticipated to diminish over the long run as more and more women
entered into the workforce and qualified for Social Security bene-
fits on their own.5 7
If the taxpayer's dependents or spouse also work, they may
be eligible for Social Security benefits based on their own earn-
ings.58 However, the dual entitlement rule prevents an individual
from receiving benefits under both his or her employment as well
as his or her spouse's. 59 Under the dual entitlement rule, although
a spouse may be entitled to benefits based on his or her own in-
come and benefits based on his or her spouse's income, he or she
receives the larger of the two and not both.60
Auxiliary benefits not only create spousal benefits while a
spouse is alive, but also provide for benefits to the surviving
spouses.61 Based on the present Social Security benefit structure,
Table 2 represents the benefits available to spouses of a single-
earner family and a dual earning family:
that married women were dependent on their husband for support. See Burke &
McCouch, supra note 7, at 1214-15.
56. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 7, at 1214-15. In the 1930s only 25% of
women worked. See id. at 1215. Today, nearly 60% of women participate in the
labor force. See WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 4, at 11.
57. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 7, at 1215. This expected decline in
spousal benefits has not occurred, however. Currently, 37% of women receive So-
cial Security benefits based on their own earnings. See WOMEN AND RETIREMENT
SECURITY, supra note 4, at 8. It is estimated that "74% of elderly widows receive
benefits on the earnings of their deceased spouse." Id. at 10. This continued de-
pendency is due to several factors, including: 1) Women continue to make less
than men on average (in 1997, women in full-time jobs earned an average of 74
cents for each dollar earned by men in full-time jobs); 2) Women tend to work more
part-time jobs than full-time jobs (in 1998, 25.8% of women working were em-
ployed in part-time jobs and represented 67.5% of all part-time workers); and 3)
Women leave the workforce for more years than men for child caring reasons and
other responsibilities (of individuals retiring in 1996, women averaged 27 years of
employment while men averaged 39 years). See id. at 8-9. As a result of these fac-
tors, working women's average lifetime earnings tend to be lower than men's,
which causes women to receive Social Security benefits based on their spouse's
earnings rather than their own. See id. at 3, 8.
58. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 7, at 1225.
59. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Social Security: What Can Be Done About
Marriage Penalties?, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 553, 555 (1997)
[hereinafter Forman, Marriage Penalties].
60. See id. Because of this restriction, many commentators have termed the
dual entitlement rule a marriage penalty. See id.
61. See Social Security History Page, supra note 27, at 6 (discussing the 1939




Table 2. Comparison of Survivor Benefits Between Single-
Earner and Dual-Earner Couples
Average Social Security Benefits Survivor's








Wife 506000 25,000 25,000 60%
Total
The above table assumes fifty percent Social Security benefit
distribution of average lifetime earnings. This assumption is used
for simplification purposes, as calculation of actual Social Security
benefits for each couple, based on average lifetime earnings would
unnecessarily complicate the analysis. Although actual benefit
amounts are not used, the percentage of survivor's benefits to cou-
ple's benefits accurately reflects the effect of current regulations.
As demonstrated by combining data from Table 1
(Comparison of Contribution by Couples) with data reflected in
Table 2 (Comparison of Survivor Benefits by Couples), even
though a dual-earner family may contribute more to Social Secu-
rity than the single-earner family, the dual-earner family receives
less in benefits in comparison to the single-earner family. This
disparity, of course, continues, and even increases, after the death
of a spouse. 62
62. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 11; see also Burke &
McCouch, supra note 7, at 1226 (explaining that this disparity between benefits
received and paid, as it relates to widows of single and dual-earner couples, is in-
creased further if each couple makes over the Social Security cap).
[Vol. 17:537
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III. Problems Facing Social Security
Each year, the Social Security Administration, in its trustee's
annual report, includes its projection regarding the future of Social
Security, as prepared by its actuaries. 63 Based on a recent report,
the Social Security fund is expected to be operating in a deficit by
the year 2029.64 A brief discussion of some of the factors contrib-
uting to the current deficit projection follows.
A. Funding for Retiree Benefits
The Social Security retirement system is structured under a
pay-as-you-go system.65 Under this structure, FICA payroll taxes
collected from current employees are used to pay benefits for cur-
rent retirees.66 In essence, then, each generation of retirees must
depend on the next generation to fund their Social Security bene-
fits.67
Because of this dependency, the ratio of workers to retirees is
very important. 68 When Social Security was enacted, there were
approximately forty-two workers for one retiree. 69 Today, because
of lower birth rates and longer life expectancy, gained through ad-
vances in the medical field in treating diseases, the ratio of work-
ers to retirees has decreased significantly. 70 The current ratio is
3.3 workers to 1 retiree. 7 1 The projected ratio for the year 2050 is
1.5 to 2 workers to 1 retiree. 72 As this ratio continues to drop,
there will not be enough workers necessary to fund the benefit ob-
ligations for retirees, a population which is projected to increase
over the years due to longer life expectancy. 73 Thus, the outflow of
cash needed for Social Security benefits will be greater than the
63. See Goodman & Cordell, supra note 27, at 2 (stating that these projections
include three ranges of estimates: the high-cost view (also called the pessimistic
viewpoint), the intermediate projection and the low-cost prospects (also called the
optimistic view)). Some commentators believe that the pessimistic projections are
the more realistic estimates, although the Social Security Administration advo-
cates the intermediate projection. See id.
64. See Forman, Protecting, supra note 2, at 1658.
65. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 920.
66. See id.
67. See Goodman & Cordell, supra note 27.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 5.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. (citing intermediate projections for the worker/retiree ratio). The




inflow from the FICA payroll tax.
In contrast to these projections, the Social Security Fund cur-
rently operates under a surplus (cash inflow from payroll taxes ex-
ceeds cash out-flow for current retirees).7 4 This surplus is held in a
trust fund. 75 In actuality, the Social Security surplus is borrowed
by the Federal Government to pay for other governmental expen-
ditures. 76 In exchange, Treasury Bonds, really representing IOUs
from the Federal Government to itself, are issued to the Social Se-
curity trust fund.77 At the end of 1990, the trust fund's surplus
was estimated at $214 billion.7 8 Unfortunately, the surplus is not
sufficient to cover a single year's benefit obligations.7 9
B. Longer Life Expectancy
When Social Security was enacted, the average life expec-
tancy was 61.4 years for men and 65.7 for women.80 As such, a
man was not expected to receive Social Security benefits because
his anticipated life expectancy was below the retirement age. 8'
The retired woman was expected to collect less than one year's
worth of Social Security benefits.82 Therefore, Social Security cash
outlays were not contemplated to be significant due to the low life
expectancy of both spouses.
Due to scientific advances in the medical field, however, the
average life expectancy today has increased to 72.6 years for men
and 79.3 for women. 83 At present, the average male retiree is ex-
pected to receive Social Security benefits over nearly eight years,
while for the female retiree the expectancy is over fourteen years.
When it is considered that most individuals now retire earlier, the
projections are further extended to eleven and seventeen years for
the average male and female retiree, respectively.8 4
74. See State of the Union, supra note 1. For example, total receipts for 1990
were $286 billion while only $227 billion were distributed as benefits, resulting in
a surplus of $59 billion in 1990. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 920.
75. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 920.
76. See id.
77. See Goodman & Cordell, supra note 27.
78. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 920.
79. See id. (noting that benefit obligations paid for in 1990 amounted to $227
billion). With the population of retirees growing, it is unlikely that benefit obliga-
tions will decrease. See Goodman & Cordell, supra note 27.




84. See Forman, Reforming, supra note 16, at 292. Because of expansions in
coverage in private pensions and the large economic gains in these plans, there is
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As noted previously, this increase in life expectancy is pri-
marily attributed to advancements in the field of medicine.85 Sci-
entists have been successful in identifying the causes of many dis-
eases,8 6 and in some cases what was once a life-threatening
ailment no longer poses such a threat.87 Advances in preventive
medicine have also enabled individuals to take better care of
themselves, rendering them less susceptible to diseases at an early
age.88 As a result, more individuals are living longer and collect-
ing Social Security benefits over an extended period of time.89
C. Lower Birth Rates
Simultaneously with the increase in life expectancy, people
are having fewer babies, as indicated by the decrease of the fertil-
ity rates for the U.S.90 The fertility rate represents the number of
children that women of childbearing age will have over their life-
time.91 To maintain the current population size, the fertility rate
must be 2.1.92 Presently, the U.S. fertility rate is 1.9. 93 Although
moderate projections for the future maintain the fertility rate at
1.9, other models predict a future fertility rate as low as 1.6.94 As
the number of younger people decreases and the number of older
people increases, the funding necessary for retirees faces serious
problems. 95
IV. Proposals
Estimates predict that in order for a widow to maintain the
same standard of living as when both spouses were alive, she will
need to receive eighty percent of the couple's income while both
spouses were alive.96 Yet, under current Social Security guide-
a trend towards early retirement in America. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, su-
pra note 7, at 3.








93. See id. Other recent models, however, have estimated the fertility rate to
be as low as 1.8. See id.
94. See id. Applying the pessimistic fertility rate of 1.6, 100 years from now
the population of the United States will only be slightly larger than it is today. See
id. However, the composition of the population will be significantly different, with
older individuals comprising the larger segment of the entire population. See id.
95. See id.
96. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 12.
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lines, widows receive a maximum of sixty-seven percent of pre-
death benefits. 97 In light of these facts, an important element of
any proposed reform needs to ensure that benefits to widows are at
an adequate level to provide protection against falling into pov-
erty.
A. Privatization
The privatization proposals call for dramatic alteration of the
current Social Security system. Some go as far as replacing the
entire system with personalized private pension accounts. 98 Even
Congress has caught this privatization wave with the recent pro-
posed legislation by Senator Rod Grams (R-MN) on October 6,
1998.99
According to the proposed privatization models, each individ-
ual would have a Personal Savings Account (PSA). 1°° In lieu of the
current Social Security payroll tax, each individual would contrib-
ute a predetermined percentage of his or her earnings to their
PSA. 0 1 These PSAs would be held in trust by qualified investment
firms or financial institutions approved by a separate Board cre-
ated to oversee the operation of PSAs.10 2 Individuals would have
the ability to direct and determine the investment of their PSA.1
°3
Since the driving factor behind such proposals is to match an indi-
97. See id.
98. See generally SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 13; Goodman & Cordell, su-
pra note 27.
99. See Personal Security and Wealth in Retirement Act of 1998, S. 2552, 105th
Cong. (1998).
100. See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 13, at 7.
101. See id. The proposed Senate bill calls for a minimum contribution of 5% of
covered wages earned by the employee. See S. 2552 § 251(a). Individuals can con-
tribute above the five percentage threshold but cannot surpass 25% of their wages.
See id. § 252(b)(2). Employers are required to contribute an additional 5% of em-
ployee's wages to the employee's PSA. See id. § 252(b)(3). Furthermore, if the em-
ployee's PSA balance equals the minimum retirement annuity amount, the em-
ployee may elect to stop contributions to his PSA. See id. § 252(b)(4). The
minimum retirement annuity amount is defined as a balance sufficient for an indi-
vidual to receive annuity payments equal to 150% of the poverty line over his/her
life expectancy. See id. § 256(c)(2). In addition to the minimum 5% withholding,
an additional 1.2% tax (reduced to 0.6% beginning in 2001) would be imposed to
cover transitional costs. See id. § 4(a)(2).
102. See S. 2552 § 408B(b)(3). This legislation would create the Federal Per-
sonal Retirement Investment Board [hereinafter Board]. See id. § 9(a)(1). The
duties of this Board include review and approval of investment firms and financial
institutions to serve as trustees of PSAs. See id. § 9(a)(6)(A).
103. See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 13, at 7. Under the proposed Senate
legislation, no restrictions are imposed as to the type of investment an individual
may choose. See S. 2552 § 408(b). However, a minimum rate of return of 2.5% is
mandated by the proposed Act. See id. § 9(a)(6)(B).
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vidual's contributions with benefits, the only thing that would ef-
fect an individual's level of benefits is the individual's contribu-
tion.104
Individuals participating in PSAs would not be eligible for
any OASI retirement benefits. 10 5 Those individuals without ade-
quate contributions would have to seek assistance from welfare
programs which may need to be financially supplemented to ad-
dress the additional assistance requested by retirees. 0 6 Therefore,
under this proposed scenario, we may simply be trading a large so-
cial security program for a larger welfare program. 0 7 Marital
status has no impact on the benefits an individual receives. 08 In
fact, the current proposed legislation does not address surviving
spousal benefits. 109
Other proposed privatization models have allowed the indi-
vidual account holder to designate the beneficiary of their re-
maining account balance at the time of their death or allowed for
joint accounts and survivor annuities. 110 However, there may be no
residual balance remaining or the balance may be designated to
another individual other than the spouse. In such a scenario, the
surviving spouse is left with insufficient resources for living above
the poverty level"' and may need assistance from other sources
such as welfare. In short, little protection is provided to surviving
spouses under the privatization models. Rather, under the current
proposed legislation, such auxiliary benefits are eliminated.
104. See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 13, at 7.
105. See S. 2552 § 7 (y).
106. See Forman, Marriage Penalties, supra note 59, at 556 (noting that even
ardent supporters of privatization admit that the welfare system must be supple-
mented to cover benefits lost by replacing the current system).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See generally S. 2552.
110. See Forman, Protecting, supra, note 2, at 1673-82 (discussing spousal
rights under various privatized retirement systems).
111. Assuming the surviving spouse has her own PSA, this will still not be suffi-
cient to ensure her the same living standard as that before the death of the spouse.
A surviving spouse needs 80% of total retirement earnings received before the
death of the spouse to maintain the same living standard as when the spouse was
alive. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 12. Some privatization
models have called for the surviving spouse to be automatically designated as the
recipient of any balance left in the spouse's PSA. See Forman, Protecting, supra




Social security benefits are currently computed based on the
individual's earnings, 112 not on a means test."13 Therefore, wealthy
individuals and poor families are equally entitled to benefits."
4
Because of this, some criticize the current system for providing
benefits to individuals who do not need them, thereby reducing
needed funds for poor families. 115 In response to this criticism, a
two-tier system has been proposed.116
Under the two-tier system, benefits are distributed based on
both a means test and on an equity basis. 117 Benefits distributed
in the first tier would provide the minimum monthly income nec-
essary to live above the poverty level."l 8 Benefits distributed in
the second tier would be tied to the individual's income level and
participation in the workforce. 119 Additionally, benefits under the
second tier would be based on an earnings-sharing component.
120
112. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing Social Security
benefit distribution).
113. See Munnell & Stiglin, supra note 10, at 105. Under a means test, benefits
are provided based on the needs of the individual or family to ensure adequate
benefits are provided. See id.
114. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 936 (stating that Social Security
benefits are "paid largely without regard to the financial need of the beneficiar-
ies"); see also Goodman & Cordell, supra note 27 (citing that nearly 800,000 mil-
lionaires are collecting Social Security benefits). The rationale for providing bene-
fits to wealthy individuals as well as low-income families is fairness. See id. Both
the wealthy and the low-income worker contributed to the Social Security Fund
through payroll taxes and are therefore entitled to receive a return on their con-
tribution. See id. In fact, it was this contribution requirement that set the Social
Security program apart from other welfare programs established in 1935. See id.
115. See Munnell & Stiglin, supra note 10, at 105.
116. See id. at 107-20.
117. See id. at 107.
118. See id. at 110.
119. See id. This distribution of benefits is similar to the current system in
place. See id. However, the percentage of AIME used to determine benefits under
the second tier will be lower. See id. at 110. This is primarily because of the in-
creased cost associated with tier one benefits. See id. at 109-10 (noting that if the
two-tier system was in place in 1979, approximately $12 billion would have been
expended, as opposed to the $5.4 billion expended by Social Security to ensure that
an individual's benefits were above the poverty level). Therefore, until the full cost
for benefits under the first tier can be determined, benefits under the second-tier
are unknown. See id. at 110.
120. See id. at 108; see also infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text
(discussing earnings sharing). By providing for an earnings sharing provision, the
earnings for each spouse are combined and divided equally between the couple.
See Munnell & Stiglin, supra note 10, at 108. Therefore, each spouse is entitled to
benefits based on 50% of the couple's total earnings. See id. Earnings sharing is
deemed equitable because it recognizes the contribution to the family by both
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A joint-survivor annuity option is also included. 121
Advocates of the two-tier system contend that the cost of
benefits will not increase under this proposed system; instead,
funds will be reallocated between groups of beneficiaries.
122 Oppo-
nents claim that a welfare stigma may be associated with benefits
received under the first tier. 123 Supporters of the two-tier system,
however, counter that this is an exaggerated concern. 124 Critics
also assert that because tier one benefits are tied to a means test,
benefits may be susceptible to political tinkering. 25 However, due
to the large number of retirees receiving benefits under tier one, a
reduction in tier-one benefits is politically less likely.
26
Proponents of the two-tier system applaud the proposal be-
cause it would decrease the gap between benefits received by sin-
gle-earner and dual-earner couples. 127 Because benefits are pro-
portional, each couple will receive benefits directly related to their
earnings history, minus the tier-one benefits.128 The advantage
currently afforded to single-earner couples is thereby removed.
129
Moreover, because benefits received under the first tier are above
the poverty level, benefits to widows would be higher than benefits
under the current system. 130 But benefits for the single-earner
couple widow are reduced under this plan, while benefits to the
dual-earner widow are, in some cases, increased. 13
1
Although this proposal goes farther than most to equalize the
treatment between dual and single-earner couples, it falls short in
spouse, even if one is the homemaker. See id. This is primarily based on the the-
ory that both spouses participate in the decision that one spouse stays at home.
See id. Therefore the couple should bear the cost of that decision and not just one
of the spouses. See id.
121. See id. A spouse could elect to receive 12% reduced benefits to purchase
the joint-survivor annuity option. See id.
122. See id. at 110.
123. See id. at 114 (noting that benefits under the first tier have similar charac-
teristics as welfare benefits since they are specifically tied to the poverty line and
unrelated to one's earnings).
124. See id. at 115 (noting that this stigma is overstated since a large population
of retired individuals will be receiving benefits under the first tier).
125. See id. at 114-15.
126. See id. at 115.
127. See id. at 107.
128. See id. at 118.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 116.
131. See id at 117. Under the current system, a widow from the single-earner
family is entitled to 100% of her spouse's PIk See id. However, with the earnings
sharing provision included in the two-tier plan, the same widow is entitled to only
50% of her husband's PIA. See id. The widow from a dual-earner couple, in con-
trast, would receive higher benefits if each spouse had earnings close to or above
the earnings cap. See id.
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its effort to assist widows. Instead of increasing benefits to dual-
earner widows to the level of single-earner widows, benefits be-
tween dual and single-earner are equalized by a reduction in bene-
fits to single-earner widows. Thus, under this plan, widows still
face a high risk of falling into poverty due to inadequate Social Se-
curity benefits.
Furthermore, unless the couple selects the joint-survivor an-
nuity, benefits to surviving spouses are eliminated.132 Under the
two-tier plan, the surviving spouse continues to receive the same
level of benefits as before the death of her spouse. Although this
will only provide her with fifty percent of the couple's benefits
when both were alive, the impact of the reduction of total benefits
provided is mitigated because of the minimal benefit guarantee
under the first tier. Nonetheless, under this proposal, overall
benefits for some groups of widows will be lower than those pro-
vided under the current system.
C. Change in the Structure of Benefit Distribution
1. Earnings Sharing
Touted as the best approach for eliminating marriage penal-
ties,133 earnings sharing is a concept that has been discussed for
numerous years. Under this approach, the earnings of both
spouses are aggregated. 134 The total income for the family is then
divided in half and credited to each spouse. 135 The benefits of each
spouse would be based on one-half of the marriage income plus
any amounts credited to that spouse prior to the marriage. 36 By
including the additional income earned by the secondary worker in
a marriage, this plan virtually guarantees greater benefits. 37
Many commentators contend that under the present system, the
income earned by secondary workers is simply ignored in deter-
mining benefits to the couple if it is not more than one-third of the
other spouse's earnings. 138
132. See id. at 118.





138. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 7, at 1219-24 (citing Edward J.
McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in
the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 987-88, 996-1005 (1993)). According to McCaffery,
if a spouse earns less than one-third of her husband's income, her Social Security
benefits will be based solely on the husband's income level. See id. Only when her
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The earnings sharing plan removes the current disparity of
benefits between single-earner and dual-earner couples with iden-
tical levels of income.13 9 But at the same time, this plan also
eliminates all surviving spousal benefits.140 Because the benefits
for each spouse are based on one-half of the marriage's aggregate
income, the surviving spouse's benefits will not decrease at the
death of the spouse.' 4 ' In essence, a person's retirement benefit is
constant throughout the person's retirement, adjusted only for cost
of living.
This level of constant benefits comes at a cost, however. By
combining and splitting the aggregate earnings for couples, many
individuals are faced with a reduced basis used for calculating
their Social Security benefits. Single-earner couples are impacted
most significantly by this reduced basis.142 This proposed reform,
thereby, shifts inequalities from one group to another.
Additionally, because of the reduced base for determining So-
cial Security benefits, the surviving spouse's level of benefits would
be lower than that under the current plan. Like the two-tier plan,
this proposal would address the disparity in widows' benefits by
reducing the surviving spouses' benefits of single-earner couples
rather than increasing the benefits to widows from dual-earner
couples. As such, this proposal equalizes benefits by reducing the
benefits of one widow when even that level of benefit (maximum
sixty-seven percent of benefits before the death of her spouse) is
not enough to prevent her from falling into poverty. From this
perspective, such a proposal would only serve to increase the num-
ber of widows in poverty by not providing an adequate level of
benefits.
2. Shifting of Benefits
Certain commentators have suggested that the only neces-
sary modification to Social Security relates to its current distribu-
tion of benefits to couples. 143 Such modifications, however, do not
earnings exceed one-third of her husband's income would she be eligible for Social
Security benefits under her own income. See id.
139. See id. at 1232.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1233 n.136.
142. Taking the single-earner family reflected in Table 1, the total income for
the couple equals $100,000. Under the Earnings Sharing plan, each spouse's bene-
fits would be based on $50,000. Keeping all assumptions the same, the single-
earner's spouse is eligible for $25,000 in Social Security benefits. These benefits
would not increase upon the death of one spouse, since surviving spouse benefits
are eliminated under this plan.
143. See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 13-15.
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necessarily propose a solution for correcting the current inequality
of benefits to dual-earner income families versus single-earner
families.
a. Burkhauser and Sineeding Proposal
One proposal represents itself as a revenue-neutral solu-
tion. 144 It calls for a shifting of benefits by reducing the benefits to
families while both spouses are alive and redistributing this same
income to the survivor. 145 This redistribution of income increases
benefits to widows and decreases the risk of falling into poverty. 146
Furthermore, it is contended that the reduced income level when
both spouses are alive will not negatively impact the couple. 147
Table 3 demonstrates the extent of redistribution of income pro-
posed by Burkhauser and Smeeding1 48
Table 3. Comparison of Present Survivor Benefits to
Burkhauser and Smeeding Proposed Survivor Benefits
as a Percentage of Couple's Total Benefits
Present Proposed
Couple Survivor's Benefits/ Survivor's Benefits/





As the above table shows, Burkhauser and Smeeding's pro-
posal would provide dual-earner survivors and single-earner sur-
vivors an equal ratio of survivor's benefits to overall couple's bene-
fits. However, although the percentages are the same, the actual
dollar amount of benefits may not be because of the initial dispar-
ity in distribution of income between dual and single-earner fami-
lies. Burkhauser and Smeeding's proposal attempts to reduce the
disparity by calculating the benefits to survivors based on total
144. See id. at 13.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. As noted earlier, while both spouses are alive, the couple faces a
relatively low risk of falling into poverty. See id. at 2.
148. BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 7, at 13.
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benefits received by the couple while both spouses were alive. 149
Burkhauser and Smeeding do not anticipate that this redis-
tribution of income will require substantial additional outlays.
150
Nevertheless, what minimal additional amounts are needed can be
achieved by establishing a short delay in retirement by men, as
recommended by Burkhauser and Smeeding.151 Overall, this pro-
posal would not significantly alter the total amount of benefits
provided to a couple; it merely shifts benefits so that the surviving
spouse receives higher benefits at a time when it is most needed. 152
b. Social Security Advisory Council's Proposal
The Social Security Advisory Council recently proposed a
similar redistribution plan.153 Under the Social Security Advisory
Council's proposal, surviving spouse benefits would gradually in-
crease to a cap representing the higher of the decedent's benefits
currently available under the laws or seventy-five percent of the
combined benefits received by the couple before the death of the
spouse. 54 This increase in surviving spousal benefits would be off-
set by a reduction in spousal benefits from fifty percent to thirty-
three percent while both spouses are alive.155
The Social Security Advisory Council plan, similar to the
Burkhauser and Smeeding proposal, does not address the current
disparity in the distribution of benefits to dual and single-earner
couples. However, while both proposals take the necessary step to
increase benefits to widows, the actual dollar benefits are still
negatively impacted by the current disparity of benefits to dual-
earner widows.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 14 (comparing their proposal to the Retirement Equity Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984), which mandated employers to pay
pensions to workers in a form of joint and last survivor annuity instead of a single-
life annuity). The rationale for the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 was to
"encourage workers to shift benefits toward survivors in a revenue-neutral way."
Id. The redistribution of Social Security benefits in a similar manner is also be-
ieved to be a revenue-neutral way of increasing Social Security benefits to survi-
vors. See id.
151. See id. at 13.
152. See id. at 14.
153. See Forman, Marriage Penalties, supra note 59, at 557.




D. Change in Tax Structure
1. Expansion of Tax Base for Social Security
In 1988, Americans reported total personal income of $4056
billion on their tax returns. 15 6 Only $2561 billion of that amount,
however, was subjected to Social Security tax. 57 This amount rep-
resents only sixty-three percent of total income reported for 1988
that was subjected to Social Security tax,15 8 since only covered
wages are subjected to Social Security taxes. 5 9 These wages only
include earnings from employment and exclude other forms of in-
come such as dividends, interest, rental income, gains from sale of
property and pension annuities. 6 0
In 1988, Americans reported the following unearned income
amounts not subject to payroll taxes: $77 billion as dividend in-
come, $187 billion as interest income, $154 million in gains from
sale of property and $150 billion in pension annuities.' 16 Such in-
come items have historically been excluded from Social Security
taxes to encourage private capital investment which in turn spurs
economic growth. The justification for providing such favorable
tax treatment to these income items is not as strong today as it
was when Social Security was enacted in 1935. In light of the dire
predictions for Social Security, one argument would be to include
capital investment income in the tax base subjected to the Social
Security payroll tax. However, the inclusion of investment income
would alter the current connection between Social Security bene-
fits and earnings.
An increase in the Social Security tax base only addresses the
projected Social Security deficit by increasing contribution levels to
the Social Security fund. 6 2 This proposal does not impact the dis-
parity in benefits to widows of dual and single-earner couples.
156. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 930.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 928.
160. See id. at 930.
161. See id. at 930-31.
162. The Social Security income cap is projected to still be in effect so it is possi-
ble that not all of an individual's income will be subject to the Social Security pay-
roll tax. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing earnings cap
imposed on payroll taxes). Nonetheless, by including these various capital income
items, contributions are projected to increase. See Goodman & Cordell, supra note
27. Goodman and Cordell, however, contend that this increase in tax revenue will
come at a cost. See id. (projecting that this tax will shrink the infusion of capital
into the market causing a reduction in wages, which will lead to a reduction in
payroll tax contributions).
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One possible impact of such a proposal could be that by increasing
the Social Security fund and improving the financial viability of
Social Security, a more favorable environment is created to ad-
dress the inequalities in widow benefits.
2. Modification of Earnings Cap for Social Security Tax
As noted earlier, Social Security tax is imposed only on an
earned income cap of $68,400 for 1998.163 The earning cap for
1999 is $72,600.164 Earnings above the cap are not subjected to the
Social Security tax, nor are employers required to pay FICA taxes
for employee earnings above this cap. 65 In light of the recent
prognosis concerning the viability of the Social Security system,
the use of this cap should be re-examined. If the earnings cap is
raised or eliminated, more contributions would be made to the So-
cial Security Fund. However, higher level of benefits would also be
paid out since benefits would be determined using the higher level
of income. It is unclear if the cash inflow from the added contribu-
tion would exceed the outflow of increased benefit payments.
Fairness demands that if a greater percentage of an individ-
ual's income is subjected to the payroll tax, then his or her respec-
tive levels of benefits should also be determined using the ex-
panded income base. These proposals will only be reasonable if
the individual's benefits would be determined based on the level of
income taxed. This reasoning is in accord with one of Social Secu-
rity's original objectives-providing some form of return on an in-
dividual's contribution in the form of benefits to the individual. 66
As an alternative, if the cap is to remain intact, benefits should
continue to be calculated based on the income cap. 167 This would
ensure a closer match of benefit and contribution to Social Secu-
rity.
As with the proposals to expand the taxable base for the So-
cial Security tax, these proposals have no impact on the disparity
of benefits between dual-earner income and single-earner families.
This is primarily because benefits are determined based on the
status of the couple as single-earner and dual-earner, and corre-
sponding spousal income, and not the aggregate income of the cou-
163. See Forman, Protecting, supra note 2, at 1655.
164. See TREANOR ET AL., supra note 41, at 7.
165. See Forman, Fairness, supra note 6, at 918.
166. See Goodman & Cordell, supra note 27.
167. To illustrate this, if an individual earned $100,000, her Social Security
benefit would only be based on $68,400 of her income since that is the level at
which she contributed to Social Security.
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ple or their contributions made to the Social Security Fund. How-
ever, as noted above, with increased funding to the Social Security
Fund, steps may then be taken to address this inequality in bene-
fits to widows.
The problem with most of the proposals discussed above is
that they are vague and incomplete as to their treatment of sur-
viving spousal benefits. Furthermore, it is unclear if the present
disparity between widows of dual and single-earner families would
be reduced or even eliminated by some of the proposals.
V. Author's Proposal
All proposals for Social Security reform must confront the
hard reality that benefits to one group of individuals will be lower
than their current basis. It would be nearly impossible to provide
a solution that would provide equitable benefits to all, provide a
high rate of return on contributions and maintain a rational rela-
tionship between payroll taxes and benefits without significantly
increasing the funding through increased payroll taxes. In light of
these limitations, the best reform may be one that keeps the cur-
rent structure substantially intact and only mildly modifies it. In
this spirit, the following represents this Article's proposal.
The reader should be aware that the benefit structure pro-
posed in this Article is in lieu of the spousal and survivor benefits
currently in place. Furthermore, benefits calculated based on the
proposed changes are based on both spouses being of the same age
and retiring at age sixty-five. The author acknowledges that this
situation may not be representative of all retired or soon to be re-
tired individuals. This Article does not attempt to address all sce-
narios involving retired couples. Rather, this Article merely pro-
poses a new benefit scheme that addresses the current disparity in
benefits to widows from dual-earner couples. The proposed
scheme may require further modifications to address situations
which deviate from the example used.
A. Executive Summary
First, one purpose of Social Security was to provide social in-
surance to retired individuals. Seen in this light, Social Security
must, at a minimum, provide enough benefits to retired individu-
als to live above the poverty level. Second, in order to provide
some return on contributions made to the Social Security fund, all
taxed earnings (up to the income cap) should be included in the
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calculation of benefits for the couple. Therefore, in dual-earner
families, the wages of the spouse, regardless of the amount, should
be included in the determination of the couple's benefits. Finally,
benefits should be distributed based on the life expectancy of the
spouse expected to live the longest. In most cases, that is the
woman.
B. Increase of Income Base
Under this proposal, benefits to the couple are increased be-
cause of the consideration of wages for both spouses. By increas-
ing the income base used for determining benefits, recognition is
provided to all individual contributions. Under the current sys-
tem, a spouse's Social Security contributions may be, at times, ig-
nored in determining the benefits for that spouse. 1 8 The in-
creased income base will have no impact on single-earner couples
while favorably affecting benefits to dual-earner couples. Under
this plan, benefits are more rationally related to the couple's over-
all contribution than the current system. Table 4 demonstrates
the impact on benefits under this proposed plan:169
Table 4. Comparison of Monthly Benefits Under the Pres-
ent System to Monthly Benefits Under the Proposed Plan
Earnings Monthly Benefits




The increased benefits to dual-earner couples while both
168. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing the dual-
entitlement rule); see also Burke & McCouch, supra note 7 (citing Becker's com-
ments that a wife needs to make more than one-third of her husband's salary in
order to earn any benefits from her contributions to the Social Security Fund).
169. For ease of comparison, amounts are calculated based on annuity tables
using five percent interest rates compounded monthly. See JACK C. ESTES &
DENNIS R. KELLEY, MCGRAW-HILL'S COMPOUND INTEREST AND ANNUITY TABLES 16
(1993). For simplicity, it is assumed that the husband is 65 with a life expectancy
of 16 more years. See Women and Retirement Security, supra note 2, at 8. The
wife is assumed to be 65 as well with a life expectancy of 20 years. See id.
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spouses are alive may, however, be adversely affected when con-
sidered with the second provision of this proposal.
C. Change in Life Expectancy Calculation
Currently, an individual's actuarial life expectancy is factored
into the level of benefits each individual receives. However, under
this proposed plan, benefits for the couple are grouped together
and distributed based on the life expectancy of the longest-living
spouse. Under this methodology, since women on average live
longer than men, the wife's life expectancy is used. The grouping
of the couple's benefits together is based on the concept of the
family being one unit.170 The current dividing of benefits between
the spouses ignores the fact that couples jointly consume and
share benefits. By combining the benefits of the couple, this pro-
posal acknowledges the practice of sharing of benefits between
spouses. Table 5 demonstrates the impact of considering benefits
only over the life expectancy of the wife: 171
Table 5. Comparison of Monthly Benefits Under the Pres-
ent System to Benefits Under the Proposed Plan Based on
Wife's Life Expectancy
Earnings Monthly Benefits
Current Proposed Proposed Plan





Widows 1 $520 $758 $660
170. The recognition of married couples as one single economic unit is not some-
thing new. Currently, under Internal Revenue Code section 1041, property trans-
fers between spouses are deemed a tax-neutral transaction resulting in no
gain/loss recognition. See I.R.C. § 1041 (1998). In the house report on section 1041
Congress deemed it "inappropriate to tax transfers between spouses ... [because
of) the fact that a husband and wife are a single economic unit." H.R. REP. No. 98-
432 pt. 2, at 1491 (1984). Other tax code provisions further such views. See gener-
ally I.R.C. § 1014 (1998) which makes gifts between spouses a non-taxable event.
171. It is assumed that the wife is 65 years old with a life expectancy of 20
years. See WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 4, at 8. Amounts are
calculated using annuity tables with five percent interest rates compounded
monthly for 20 years. See ESTES & KELLEY, supra note 169, at 16.
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Distributing benefits over the longer life expectancy results
in the same level of benefits to widows as when both spouses were
alive. However, benefits will be lower than under the current sys-
tem when both spouses are alive. But at this stage of their lives,
the couple does not face a significant risk of falling into poverty.
172
At the death of a spouse, when the surviving spouse faces a signifi-
cant risk of falling into poverty, 173 benefits will not decrease.
Critics of this proposal may argue that maintaining a con-
stant level of benefits over a longer life expectancy increases the
financial burden on Social Security. Since no additional funding is
provided under this proposal, by providing a higher level of sur-
viving spouse benefits, opponents will contend that the total cash
outflow is higher than under the current system. As Table 6 dem-
onstrates, on average, the total cash outflow resulting from this
plan is actually lower than under the current system:
Table 6. Comparison of Total Cash Out-Flow Under Cur-
rent System and Proposed Plan
Benefit Pay-Outs
Current System Proposed Plan
Total Monthly Benefits $709 $660
Total Annual Benefits $8,508 $7,920
Total Life Expectancy
Benefits $161,088174 $158,400175
172. See WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 4, at 12 (noting that
the poverty rate for elderly married couples was 4.6% in 1997).
173. See WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 4, at 12 (noting that
the poverty rate for widows was 18% in 1997).
174. Amount is calculated as follows:
Husband's total Social Security benefit over his life expectancy: $379 x 12
months x 16 years = $72,768.
Wife's total Social Security benefit over her life expectancy:
While husband is alive: $330 x 12 months x 16 years = $63,360.
Sixteen years is used as that is the life expectancy of the husband. While the hus-
band is alive, the wife, under the current system, only receives $330.
During widowhood: At the death of the husband, the wife is also entitled to re-
ceive half of the husband's Social Security benefit of $190 per month. Therefore
for the remaining four years of the wife's life, her total Social Security benefit is
$520 monthly, $6,240 annually and $24,960 over the four years.
Total life expectancy benefit of $161,088 is calculated as the total of $72,768 +
$63,360 + $24,960.
175. This amount is calculated by multiplying the annual Social Security benefit
amount of $7,920 by 20 years, the life expectancy of the wife.
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A second criticism of this proposed plan may be that by pro-
viding constant benefits to the surviving spouse, those individuals
are receiving more than is necessary. In other words, since wid-
ows only need eighty percent of the total benefits received while
both spouses are alive, exceeding that level is actually providing
excess benefits not needed. Under the current conditions, widows
face nearly a four times greater risk of falling into poverty than
married elderly couples. Additionally, because assets are often
used to address the medical concern of the dying spouse or may be
bequeathed to others at the death of the spouse, widows do not
have access to many assets to address any emergencies that may
occur during their lifetime. Widows, in fact, rely more on Social
Security benefits as their main source of income than any other
members of the elderly population. With all these financial obsta-
cles faced by the widow, the additional amount provided under the
proposed plan merely ensures that adequate funds are available to
the widow to address ailment or other needs in the future. This
proposed plan does not, as some critics may contend, make the
widow richer than she is already.
VI. Conclusion
More and more elderly widows are entering poverty, or facing
the risk of poverty each day. The Social Security regulations,
however, have provided no added protection to alleviate some of
these women's concerns. In fact, under the current Social Security
system, these women's own work efforts are often not even consid-
ered in determining their benefit levels. By continuing to favor
single family earners and the "traditional" family earning struc-
ture, Social Security has failed in it's efforts to provide adequate
benefits as well as to provide a return on a retiree's contribution to
the Social Security Fund to these women.
In light of the plight faced by elderly widows, Social Security
reforms should be examined with the perspective of how the pro-
posals will impact elderly widows. While some proposals do in-
crease the connection between benefits and contributions, several
strip the widow of the surviving benefits currently in place. Such
proposals would continue the problem and even increase the risk
of poverty to elderly widows. Under these proposals, we may be
faced with a larger welfare program in place of a reduced Social
Security system. Such a prospect calls into question the benefits
touted by such proposals.
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Many reform proposals contain significant overhauls to the
current Social Security structure, while others call for the com-
plete elimination of it. This Article maintains that the current sys-
tem only needs to be modified slightly to address the concerns
faced by elderly widows. By taking steps to ensure minimum
benefit levels above the poverty line, Social Security will be taking
a step closer to providing social insurance to all retired individu-
als. Further, by providing benefits based on full contributions to
the Social Security Fund, benefits will be more rationally tied to
contributions. Determining benefits using the longer life expec-
tancy of the spouse of the couple further ensures that benefits are
reallocated appropriately. Under the proposed reform, benefits
remain the same after the death of a spouse, and ensure that the
widow will not face lower benefits in a time when she needs those
benefits the most.

